THE most visible and persistent feature of the U.S. financial markets thus far during the 1980s has been high interest rates. Observed nominal interest rates on most instruments traded in the U.S. debt markets have set record highs twice since 1980. Perhaps more important, "real" interest rates, in the sense of observed nominal rates less a presumed expectation of future price inflation, have been unprecedentedly high as well. During the past few years nominal interest rates first rose to levels far above the prevailing inflation rate, and more recently the decline in nominal interest rates has lagged well behind the slackening pace of inflation. Especially for instruments of short maturity, for which inferences about expectations of inflation in the distant future are not necessary, these high nominal interest rates have clearly corresponded to high real rates as well.
sample forecast period under examination. This assumption is especially important for the error decompositions underlying the paper's conclusions about the reasons for the observed high level of short-term interest rates. The analysis compares the actual path of short-term interest rates to the path that would have been consistent with historical relations if they had remained as they were in the past. By contrast, an announced and credible change of policy regime like that instituted by the Federal Reserve System in October 1979 can change any or all parameters of a model like the one employed here. If such a break did in fact occur-and there is evidence that one did-it would then not be possible to recover the structural disturbances from the corresponding forecast errors using the model's historically estimated coefficients. The importance of this argument is an empirical issue, and in the final section of the paper we present evidence bearing on it in the context of the exercise reported here.
The analysis reveals that short-term interest rates since October 1979 have been "too high" in the sense discussed above and that the familiar story of relatively little money for the prevailing levels of economic activity (in particular, the slow growth of real money balances due to the combination of slow growth of nominal money supply and sluggish deceleration of price inflation) goes a long way toward explaining why this has been so. In contrast to earlier postsample periods, the model substantially underpredicts short-term interest rates on average during 1979:4-1983:2. Decomposition of the model's forecast errors shows that unexpectedly slow growth in money supply and unexpectedly rapid price inflation are the largest factors accounting for this underprediction. The evidence indicating a shift in the model's slope parameters warrants caution in interpreting the latter results, however; such results are perhaps more suggestive as an aid to intuition than they are directly descriptive.
The Model and Its Interest Rate Forecasts
Friedman's earlier model includes empirical estimates for relations describing aggregate demand, aggregate supply, money demand, money Apart from revisions in the data, these estimates differ from those presented in the previous BPEA paper in two ways. First, while the money demand equation retains the original specification, money is defined here as the narrow MI money stock. (It was M2 in the original version.)6 Second, this change in the definition of the money stock variable requires a slightly different specification of the money supply equation, involving the introduction of an intercept and the discount rate.7 In all other respects, the model's definitions and specifications are exactly the same as in the original.
There is no point in repeating here the detailed discussion of each equation presented with the original estimates in Friedman's 1977 paper, but a few summary comments may be helpful. The aggregate demand equation includes an interest rate, or IS curve, effect (here based on a nominal long-term interest rate), a fiscal policy effect, and a terms-oftrade effect.8 The aggregate supply equation relates price setting to real economic activity and also to the terms of trade. The money demand equation has the standard real LM curve specification. The money supply equation combines a nonborrowed reserves multiplier effect with a borrowed reserves response associated with the discount rate and an excess reserves response associated with the short-term market interest rate. The term structure equation, which provides a link between the long-term interest rate in the aggregate demand equation and the shortterm interest rate in the money demand and money supply equations, combines a form of the standard expectations hypothesis with a debtmanagement policy effect.9 The nominal income identity is straightforward.
For convenience, all equations of the model are assumed to be linear in logarithms, and no variable is lagged more than once. Hence the model is a simple linear first-order difference equation system. As applied here, the model determines six variables: the growth rates of real and nominal income, prices and the money stock, and short-and long-term interest rates. Exogenous variables include fiscal policy (high-employment gov-6. At that time it appeared that the Federal Reserve System was moving toward an M2 orientation for monetary policy. Subsequent experience showed the primacy of MI, however.
7. In addition, the money supply equation is estimated here using Fair's method; see note 4. The inclusion of the discount rate may make it appear to be too easy for the model to forecast interest rates, but the steady-state coefficient relating the logarithm of the discount rate to the logarithm of the Treasury bill rate is only 0.06.
8. See the text below for a discussion of real interest rates in the IS curve and for an estimated example.
9. In the reestimated term-structure equation the coefficients on the two short-term interest rate terms are no longer significant individually but are highly significant jointly; the F-statistic for a test of the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero is 21.26. ernment expenditures), monetary policy (nonborrowed reserves and the discount rate), debt-management policy (the maturity of outstanding government debt), and the dollar price of imports. The model's compactness and simplicity result from the imposition of many restrictions on the data. The advantage of such restrictions is not just convenience but the ease with which it is possible to carry out analytical exercises such as the ones reported below.
The top panel of table 1 shows the model's quarter-by-quarter performance in forecasting short-term interest rates from 1976:3 to 1979:3-the first thirteen quarters beyond the end of the sample period. These forecasts are based on a dynamic simulation in which, after the first postsample quarter, the forecast of each variable relies on the model's forecast of all endogenous variables in the previous period. Although the short-term interest rate variable generated by the model is a logarithm, for convenience the table reports values converted to natural units stated in percentage points.
The model correctly forecasts the general upward trend of short-term interest rates during this thirteen-quarter period, though hardly without errors. The forecast error has a mean of 0.30 percentage point-that is, a small overprediction-and a root mean square of 0.70 point. For a thirteen-quarter beyond-sample dynamic forecast, with a model designed with compactness and simplicity as top priorities, this performance is far from poor. More specifically, it suggests that the structural restrictions that the model places on the historical correlations among the included variables represent an efficient summary of the data and also capture the essential features of the correlations among variables relevant for forecasting.
The bottom panel of the table shows an analogous account of the model's performance for 1979:4-1983:2, based on a reestimation of the model using 1961:1-1979:3 data. An appendix to this paper shows the reestimated equations. As above, the forecasts are based on a dynamic simulation relying, except for the first quarter, on the model's own forecast of all endogenous variables. The results of Chow tests do not indicate evidence of a break after 1976:2 for any of the model's five estimated equations, so that in principle there is no need to use a reestimated model for the second forecast period.10 Nevertheless, the two sets of forecasts and forecast errors are more directly comparable if 10. The F-statistics are reported in the first column of table 5 below. where the circumflex indicates a forecast value. In other words, the forecast error of the log level of the short-term rate equals the sum of past forecast errors of the difference of the log of the short-term rate. This procedure exactly decomposes the log error in forecasting each interest rate level into contributions representing the model's five structural disturbances. However, it is convenient to think about interest rates in natural units rather than in logarithms. Because the log operator is nonlinear, the decomposition of the log errors does not correspond exactly to a decomposition of the natural-unit errors. The discussion proceeds as if the correspondence were exact, so that a disturbance contributing, say, Z percent of the log error is likewise assumed to contribute Z percent of the error stated in natural units.
In general, positive disturbances to aggregate demand, ul, price setting, u2, and money demand, U3, all cause underpredictions of the short-term interest rate, while positive disturbances to money supply, U4, and the yield-spread relation, U5, both cause overpredictions. The signs of these effects are easy to explain in terms of the determination of the short-term rate in the equations expressing money demand and money supply. Because of the dependence of the demand for real balances on real economic activity, a positive disturbance to aggregate demand or to the money demand function itself increases the demand for real balances, and hence nominal money demand given prices. Similarly, a positive disturbance to prices raises money demand given the factors determining the demand for real balances. A positive disturbance to the nominal money supply has the reverse effect. Finally, a positive disturbance to the yield-spread relation reduces the demand for money by diminishing aggregate demand through the effect of the longterm interest rate in the IS curve. Table 2 presents the results of applying the method described above to decompose the short-term interest rate forecast errors shown in table  1 percentage point average overprediction during 1976:3-1979:3 therefore resulted in part from some offsetting of structural disturbances, but the chief implication of this decomposition is that all disturbances were small (in absolute value) on average. In short, the forecast for 1979:3 through 1976:3 was right for the right reason. By contrast, the -0.72 percentage point mean underprediction of the bill rate for 1979:4-1983:2 was much more the result of large structural disturbances offsetting one another. The main factors at work here were an average positive disturbance to price inflation and a large average negative disturbance to money supply growth, which raised the bill rate by 3.98 points and 2.69 points, respectively. Largely offsetting these effects was a large average positive disturbance to the yield-spread relation, which lowered the bill rate by 5.17 points.
Elements in the Decomposition
The model's average forecast of the short-term interest rate for the period since October 1979 contains a large element of being right (or at least not dramatically wrong) for the wrong reason. Three phenomenaan average positive disturbance to price inflation, an average negative disturbance to money supply growth, and an average positive disturbance to the yield spread-came close to offsetting one another. Each of these three large average disturbances merits separate consideration.
First, the average positive disturbance to the price-setting relation indicates that since October 1979 price inflation has decelerated even more sluggishly than would have been consistent with the relevant historical experience.'2 Because of the simple specification of the price (aggregate supply) equation as shown in table 1, the only elements of that historical experience that matter in this context are real economic activity, the terms of trade, and the force of inertia as represented by past inflation rates. A positive disturbance on average during 1979:4-1983:2 therefore means that, given the actual magnitude of the 1980 and 1981-82 business recessions and the appreciation of the dollar's international exchange rate during this period (and given the actual inflation rate in 1979:3), a replication of historical experience would have called for a greater slowing of inflation than actually occurred. Because prices continued to rise more rapidly than predicted, however, so too did nominal money demand. Given the growth of the nominal money supply, short-term interest rates were accordingly higher.
The finding that inflation since October 1979 slowed less than the model predicted has implications that go well beyond the specific context of this paper. Much of the debate about the effectiveness of monetary policy in recent years has focused precisely on the question of whether previous historical experience would be adequate to characterize the response of price inflation following an announced change in monetary policy regime like that implemented in October 1979. The claim in question, however, has been that prices would respond to an announced and implemented slowing of money growth by decelerating more quickly than the previous experience implied. Such a claim would be important, if true, because then slower growth of the nominal money stock need not imply so much (in the extreme, any) slower growth of real balances, and hence need not imply so much (any) slower growth of real economic activity. In short, if it had been more rapid than historical experience predicted, disinflation would have been less costly than that experience suggested. 13 12. This result is parallel to Perry's finding, presented in another paper in this issue, that the change in policy did not produce unexpectedly quick disinflation; see George L. The finding in this paper, however, isjust the opposite. The experience of price inflation since 1979 has indeed differed from what would have been expected from the severe double business recession and the sharp exchange rate appreciation on the basis of earlier correlations, but that difference has been an even slower deceleration of prices than conventional estimates had implied. Each percentage point of disinflation has therefore been not less but more costly than conventional estimates predicted.
Second, the average negative disturbance to the growth of money supply is presumably the sign of a more restrictive monetary policythough not in so obvious or straightforward a way as it may first appear. Because the sharp break in interest rate behavior that occurred between the third and fourth quarters of 1979 corresponded almost exactly to the Federal Reserve System's announcement of new monetary policy operating procedures, it is not surprising to find a negative disturbance to money supply standing out as a key factor in the model's underprediction of short-term interest rates since then. Indeed, a major theme in discussions of the subsequent high interest rates in the United States has been the role of monetary policy.
The most familiar argument along these lines has been that the Federal Reserve in October 1979 adopted not just new procedures but, more importantly, a new anti-inflationary policy orientation. According to this view, the subsequent unprecedentedly high short-term interest rates have simply reflected an unprecedentedly tight monetary policy, corresponding to substantially slower growth of the major monetary aggregates than would otherwise have taken place. An alternative argument with the same conclusion is that the increased interest rate volatility brought about by the Federal Reserve's new operating procedures has stimulated the demand for money, and hence raised interest rates for a given money supply. 14 Other variants are also possible.
The model employed here is capable of addressing some aspects of this question. The model treats the money supply as jointly determined 14. It seems more plausible a priori to consider the greater interest rate volatility a cause of higher levels of long-term interest rates but not short-term rates, in that asset price volatility probably increases the demand not just for money but also for relatively stable-price assets like Treasury bills. For an argument that volatility raises both long-and short-term interest rates, see by the nonbank public's demand for money balances and by the banking system's willingness to supply money balances, represented by an equation that takes the growth of nonborrowed reserves (and the discount rate) as given. To the extent that some change in the Federal Reserve's policy orientation altered the quarter-to-quarter supply of nonborrowed reserves, in principle the model should be able to incorporate that change into its forecast of money supply, and hence of short-term interest rates and other variables. If nothing had changed except the behavior of reserves (and if the model's equations were sufficiently accurate), the model should not have overpredicted the nominal money supply, and hence underpredicted short-term interest rates, as shown in table 2.
The results presented above therefore suggest that the source of the high short-term interest rate levels prevailing since October 1979 has not been so simple as a change in monetary policy that can be adequately summarized by the movement of nonborrowed reserves. Instead, over a time horizon as long as fifteen calendar quarters the Federal Reserve presumably adapts its provision of reserves to take account of the growth of the money stock in relation to the corresponding money growth target, so that the actual monetary policy variable over this period would more plausibly be the money supply itself rather than the supply of nonborrowed reserves as in the model. As the decomposition in table 2 shows, if the dynamic simulation of the model had taken the actual values of the nominal money supply for 1979:4-1983:2 as given instead of determining them endogenously in the simulation, the resulting forecast of the Treasury bill rate would have been 2.69 percentage points higher on average during the period. 15 To the extent that growth of the money stock itself was the Federal Reserve's monetary policy variable during this period, the results suggest that tighter monetary policy-in the sense of a slower monetary growth than would have been consistent with 15. Because of the use of simultaneous equations methods to estimate the model, simulating the model with a variable modeled as endogenous but taken as exogenous for purposes of the simulation is in general not the same as treating that variable as exogenous from the outset. An alternative approach to addressing the issues raised here in connection with monetary policy would be to introduce a "monetary policy reaction function" to explain the growth of the money supply in terms of macroeconomic variables, like inflation and the growth of real output, which the Federal Reserve presumably takes into account in choosing its money growth targets. In the context of a model constrained to be so small and simple as the one used here, however, it would be difficult to identify such a money supply function separately from money demand. previous experience, given the prevailing conditions-raised the average short-term interest rate almost 3 percentage points higher after October 1979. Two factors, then, sluggish deceleration of price inflation and slow growth of the nominal money supply, contributed greatly to the high level of short-term interest rates during 1979:4-1983:2 in ways that the model did not predict. At the same time, the shift in the yield-spread relation, which failed to predict the high level of long-term interest rates, contributed more than 5 percentage points on average in the opposite direction. 16 This quantitatively important impact of the yield-spread disturbance in mitigating the model's underprediction of short-term interest rates during 1979:4-1983:2 is not surprising in light of the well-known inadequacy of the single-equation unrestricted reduced-form approach to modeling the term structure of interest rates.17 Table 3 In sum, the model's relatively successful prediction of the increase in the average level of short-term interest rates after October 1979 is, in large part, a case of being right for the wrong reason. Disturbances in three of the model's five equations were, on average, large but offsetting. Disturbances to price setting and to money supply growth both contributed to making short-term interest rates higher than historical experience would have suggested, and hence both contributed toward underpredicting short-term rates. A disturbance to the yield-spread relationthat is, a failure of the model's term-structure equation-had the reverse effect, resulting in a fairly accurate forecast overall.
Real Interest Rates and Aggregate Demand
One potentially worrisome drawback of this analysis is that the model used to generate the forecasts of short-term interest rates reported in table 1 does not explicitly include real interest rates as a determinant of aggregate demand. Instead, as equation 1 shows, the model's aggregate demand equation relates real spending to a nominal interest rate, thereby implicitly admitting some combination of real and nominal rate effects without explicitly distinguishing either. It is possible, therefore, that the model's underprediction of short-term interest rates after October 1979 is somehow due to the omission of an explicit real interest rate from the aggregate demand equation. It turns out, however, that this is not the case. Table 4 presents an alternative short-term interest rate forecast based on a five-equation version of the model that differs from the original used above because it includes a distributed lag of ex post real short-term interest rates as a determinant of real spending and therefore excludes the original model's term-structure equation. The ex post real shortterm rate is simply the nominal short-term rate minus the annualized percentage change in the GNP price deflator. Although a long-term interest rate would be more plausible on a priori grounds, the correspon-20. The first point made in note 15 is relevant here also. 
Comments and Discussion
Jeffrey R. Shafer: Richard Clarida and Benjamin Friedman examine whether short-term interest rates in the United States have been "too high" in the 1980s. They provide an affirmative answer to this question and proceed to ask why. Their explanation is that an upward shift in the demand for money interacted with a more restrictive monetary policy after October 1979. The authors present an interesting empirical analysis, but overreach in claiming that it constitutes very strong evidence for these conclusions. For one thing, the authors' claim that interest rates are too high turns out to mean less than it sounds. And their chain of argument leading from the empirical observations to the conclusion that monetary policy is a principal cause of high interest rates has some weak links. This is not to say that the conclusion is wrong, only that the evidence in the paper is not apt. Few would quarrel with the statement that U. S. interest rates are high by historical standards, whether one is talking about long-term or shortterm rates, nominal or real. Clarida and Friedman document just how much higher rates have been since the fourth quarter of 1979 than they were earlier. But in addressing the question whether they are too high, different groups of people are asking very different things. Policymakers are asking whether interest rates are where they ought to be given policy goals such as output, employment, inflation, and capital formation, and the trade-offs among these goals involved in adjusting policy instruments to reduce interest rates. Portfolio managers are asking whether the level of rates will be sustained or will interest rates come down soon. Analytical economists are asking whether the level of interest rates is explainable by their models of how the world works and whether their models must be revised or abandoned. The authors claim that their error decomposition procedure can be used for more than just diagnosis. They attempt to draw extensive insights from the pattern of errors. I think one should be skeptical of their further claims. Let me mention several of my reservations.
First, the reported Chow tests reject structural stability of the slopes for all equations after 1979:3. The authors argue that this does not invalidate the conclusion that interest rates are high by historical standards. But they would have the reader take more than this from the paper. The estimated slope coefficients are at the heart of the errordecomposition exercise. It is going too far to claim that the results are more than indicative for diagnosing how the model has gone off track.
The apparent instability of the slope parameters also undermines the intuition that the authors seek to attach to their results. What they would have the reader do is interpret the error terms in the money and the aggregate supply equations as the effects of unobserved exogenous developments in the recent period. Implicitly they would have us attribute the errors in the term-structure equation to misspecification and hence view them as statistical artifacts to be set aside. There are no grounds for treating the different errors differently.
Second, even if one had confidence in the error decomposition, one could not extract much information about why the errors occurred. What is not known is whether the reason for large errors in the termstructure equation is a risk premium in long-term interest rates, whether it is because long-run inflationary expectations remain high, whether structural government deficits and investment incentives have raised the long-term real interest rate consistent with high employment and output, or whether there is some other reason. The model might have had something more to say on the deficit issue if it had included highemployment tax receipts, as well as government expenditures, as an exogenous variable.
Third, it is misleading to proceed from the observation that money A final, more general concern about the interpretations suggested for the error decomposition is that it presumes that the respective errors in the various equations are independent of one another. There is nothing in the nature of structural disturbances that requires them to be independent. Indeed, in many circumstances the nature of a model may impose systematic relations among structural disturbances. For example, in a demand system an increase in the error term in the demand for one good must be offset by reduced demands for other goods, or budget constraints will not be satisfied. In the present context one can invent reasons why the disturbances in different equations might be related. Taking the authors' interpretation for the sake of illustration, unusually strong exogenous inflationary pressures could well induce money supply policies that are more restrictive than normal. One would then want to call the apparent aggregate-supply and money-supply disturbances independent causes of high interest rates.
There are many more reasons than I have discussed to take the Clarida and Friedman results lightly. Few are likely to find the model satisfying and therefore would not want to take its pathologies seriously.
Although I have serious reservations about the authors' specific exercise, I believe there is considerable value in their general approach of analyzing macroeconomic issues using a small empirical model and attempting to interpret its forecasting errors using information on variables and developments that are omitted from the model. In the policy community and the financial community, people tend to look at many more things than are included in the authors' model. But without a model framework, they tend to do so in partial and often inconsistent ways. A small, closed model is a useful tool to foster consistent general equilibrium thinking in these circles. The big models are simply beyond comprehension. A small model will always have difficulty with forces and structural changes that were not spelled out in advance-the game inevitably becomes one of identifying and interpreting error terms structurally. But the analysis of errors needs to be done with close attention to what is going on at a microeconomic level, and a priori calculations of what shift might be attributable to observable developments, such as changes in reserve requirement regulations, are indispensable to such analysis. The small model user cannot abstract from the complexity of the world, even though the model does.
General Discussion
Several participants discussed the large underpredictions of longterm interest rates which, as Benjamin Friedman and Richard Clarida stress, were inadequately modeled by the term-structure equation. Stanley Fischer reasoned that the high long-term rates were possibly due to high expected inflation rates, and that inflationary expectations should be modeled explicitly in order to test for this. William Branson observed that the rise in the dollar exchange rate showed that long-term rates were not high because expected inflation was correspondingly high-a situation that should depreciate, or not affect, the exchange rate currently, and should depreciate it through time-but rather the rise represented high current and expected real rates of interest. In turn the high real interest rates are caused by the anticipated structural budget deficits that will require both investment and the trade balance to be squeezed. James Tobin replied that deficits did not provide an adequate explanation because the large rise in long-term rates and the biggest underpredictions from historical term-structure equations occurred in the months immediately following the October 1979 change in Federal Reserve policy. This was long before anyone could foresee the large budget deficits that resulted from President Reagan's 1981 fiscal changes.
Edward Bernstein suggested that financial deregulation contributed to raising the level of interest rates and producing the kind of prediction errors observed by the authors. Before March 1980 the interest rates that commercial banks and thrift institutions paid on time and savings deposits, except large CDs, were subject to ceilings established by the Federal Reserve and other regulatory agencies. Whenever money market rates rose above these ceilings, these institutions were unable to compete freely for loanable funds. As a result, Bernstein argued, the demand for credit by borrowers dependent on loans from commercial banks and thrift institutions could not fully affect market rates of interest. With deregulation, commercial banks and thrift institutions can now pay interest on checkable deposits and can bid freely in the market to acquire loanable funds. As a consequence, the interest rates at which the supply of and demand for credit are equated under given monetary and economic conditions are higher now than they would have been under previous regulations.
Robert J. Gordon suggested that financial deregulation could help explain the collapse in velocity during 1982. That collapse must have contributed to errors in the Friedman-Clarida equations and should help explain the high level of short-term interest rates actually experienced. Gordon argued that if the equations had properly specified the demand for money as depending on the difference between the interest rate on money and on other assets rather than just on the level of some interest rate, the equations would have better captured the effects of financial deregulation and performed more accurately.
Christopher Sims questioned the methodology of the FriedmanClarida model and the interpretation of its results. First, he noted that it was inappropriate to treat variables such as the discount rate as exogenous when, in fact, the discount rate appeared to follow market rates. With a reduced form impact coefficient of about 0.5, the movement in the discount rate would account for a substantial part of the mean change in short-term rates between the two periods analyzed, even if its estimated effect eventually became much smaller. Its minor impact in the reduced form for the long-term rate might help explain why the change in long rates was forecast so much worse than the change in short rates. Second, he noted that many variables, such as those that might capture changing expectations, were omitted from the model. Sims concluded that, both because of such omissions and because the exogeneity of some variables was doubtful, the authors' structural interpretation of the equation errors was unconvincing. The level of interest rates, for example, may not be caused by the factors that Friedman and Clarida stressed.
